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Essays on the Effects  
of Disability Insurance
Manasi Deshpande
I study the effects of disability insurance receipt on the 
long-term outcomes of children and their families. I use data 
from the Social Security Administration on children enrolled 
in the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program and their 
family members. 
In Chapter 1, I estimate the long-term effects of remov-
ing low-income youth with disabilities from SSI on the 
level and variance of their earnings and income in adult-
hood. Using a regression discontinuity design based on a 
change in the likelihood of removal at age 18, I find that SSI 
youth who are removed earn on average $4,000 per year 
in adulthood and recover only one-third of their lost SSI 
payments. They experience a present discounted income loss 
of $73,000 over the 16 years following removal. In addition, 
the within-person variance of income quadruples as a result 
of removal. Under various assumptions, I find that up to 
one-quarter of the recipient’s welfare loss from SSI removal 
is attributable to the increase in income volatility rather than 
the fall in income levels. This result suggests that ignoring 
the income-stabilization effects of disability programs could 
underestimate their value to recipients. 
Chapter 2 examines the effects of removing children from 
SSI before age 18, prior to the completion of education deci-
sions, on their earnings in adulthood. Using variation in child 
medical reviews, I find no evidence of a difference in earn-
ings between SSI children who are removed at a young age 
versus those who stay on, though the estimates are imprecise. 
I provide suggestive evidence on the channels through which 
early-life removal affects adult outcomes by studying effects 
on younger siblings. Using the empirical strategy from Chap-
ter 1, I find that removing an 18-year-old decreases the adult 
earnings of younger siblings by $3,100 per year. 
In Chapter 3, I estimate the effects of removing young 
children with disabilities from SSI on parental earnings and 
household income, using the child medical review empirical 
strategy from Chapter 2. I find that parents fully offset the 
SSI loss with increased earnings. The child’s removal also 
discourages parents and siblings from applying for disability 
insurance themselves. 
Chapter 1
Does Welfare Inhibit Success? The Long-Term 
Effects of Removing Low-Income Youth from 
Disability Insurance 
The perennial debate surrounding welfare programs 
reflects the trade-off between consumption smoothing and 
moral hazard in social insurance. Supporters defend wel-
fare programs as a vital lifeline for those who face barriers 
to work, while critics charge that these programs create 
perverse incentives to qualify and perpetuate dependency. In 
his influential work Losing Ground, Charles Murray (1984) 
argues that the short-term benefits provided by welfare 
programs lead to long-term losses for recipients by erod-
ing human capital and sapping work ethic. Arguments like 
Murray’s formed the intellectual basis for the 1996 U.S. 
welfare reform law that placed limits on welfare benefits and 
instituted work requirements for recipients. 
Encapsulating this debate is the controversy over the U.S. 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, a rapidly 
expanding disability insurance program that provides cash 
payments and Medicaid eligibility to low-income children 
and adults with disabilities. SSI is now the largest cash 
welfare program in the United States, paying about $50 
billion each year to 8 million recipients, including over one 
million children, or 10 percent of children living in poverty 
(Congressional Budget Office 2013). The SSI children’s 
program has been singled out by policymakers and the media 
for potential perverse incentives. Critics argue that the SSI 
children’s program encourages households to present their 
children as disabled, possibly at the expense of the child’s 
health and educational achievement (see, e.g., Wen [2010] 
and Kristof [2012]). Supporters argue that SSI payments help 
families care for children with disabilities and may improve 
the outcomes of children (see Ruffing and Pavetti [2012] and 
Vallas and Alfano [2012]). 
In this chapter, I address two long-standing questions 
about SSI that reflect the broader debate over means-tested 
programs. First, how much does SSI inhibit labor market 
success and self-sufficiency among youth? There has been 
little work on the long-term effects of disability programs 
on children and youth, even though their formative stage 
of development might make them most vulnerable to any 
perverse incentives or discouragement of achievement.1 
Second, how much insurance does SSI provide to recipients? 
Empirical work on social insurance programs has thus far 
considered their effects on the level of earnings and income, 
but their effects on the stability of income are also relevant 
if recipients are risk averse. In the presence of risk aversion, 
a monthly stream of welfare payments is more valuable than 
earnings of the same average monthly amount if welfare 
payments are more stable. Earnings volatility is especially 
relevant for low-income populations whose employment 
opportunities are limited to jobs with high turnover and 
unpredictable hours.2 
To answer these questions, I study the long-term effects of 
removing low-income youth with disabilities from SSI on the 
level and variance of their earnings and income in adulthood. 
I take advantage of a policy change in the Personal Responsi-
bility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWORA) of 1996—more 
commonly known as welfare reform—that increased the 
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number and strictness of medical reviews for 18-year-olds. 
The law applied only to children with an 18th birthday after 
August 22, 1996—the date of PRWORA enactment—creat-
ing a discontinuity in the likelihood of removal via age 18 
medical review at that date. I implement a regression discon-
tinuity design based on this change using administrative data 
from the Social Security Administration (SSA). To the best 
of my knowledge, this is the first research to estimate the 
causal impacts of program removal on the large and critical 
population of youth with disabilities and to follow them over 
multiple decades. It is also the first to consider the effect of 
disability insurance on income stability in addition to income 
levels. 
I find that SSI youth who are removed from the program 
increase their earnings minimally and, as a result, experience 
a large drop in income levels. Removed SSI youth earn on 
average $4,000 per year in adulthood, an increase of just 
$2,600 relative to those who remain on SSI. This increase 
in earnings covers only one-third of the $7,700 they lose in 
annual SSI income, and they lose an additional 10 per-
cent each year in Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) 
income because they are less likely to apply for DI. As a 
result, removed SSI youth lose on average $73,000 in present 
discounted observed income over the following 16 years, 
which is 80 percent of the original SSI cash income loss. 
Even those in the top decile of the earnings response barely 
recover the full amount of the lost SSI income. 
Despite the large average losses, removal does spur some 
SSI youth to earn at full-time, full-year levels. The likelihood 
of maintaining annual earnings above $15,000—approxi-
mately the full-time minimum wage annual earnings level—
increases by an average of 11 percentage points over the 
postperiod, off of a near-zero baseline for those who remain 
on SSI. This effect also increases over time, which suggests 
that SSI removal may have long-term effects on earnings 
behavior, perhaps through skill accumulation or greater taste 
for work. However, using survey and administrative data 
on the broader disadvantaged youth population, I find that 
removed SSI youth have substantially lower earnings levels 
and lower earnings growth than their disadvantaged but non-
disabled counterparts. 
In addition to the fall in income levels, income volatil-
ity increases considerably as a result of SSI removal. The 
within-person coefficient of variation of income quadruples, 
putting income variance for removed SSI youth at the 95th 
percentile of the control group distribution. If recipients 
are risk averse and unable to smooth consumption inter-
temporally, then both the fall in income levels and the rise 
in income volatility from SSI removal have welfare conse-
quences. Under various assumptions about the relationship 
between income and consumption for this very poor popu-
lation, I do back-of-the-envelope calculations of the welfare 
loss experienced by SSI youth from removal. I find that up to 
one-quarter of the recipient’s welfare loss from SSI removal 
is attributable to the increase in income volatility rather than 
to the fall in income levels. 
The SSI context is a useful setting for studying the effects 
of welfare programs for several reasons. First, SSI is the larg-
est cash welfare program in the United States, with annual 
expenditures more than double those of the Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program (Congressio-
nal Budget Office 2013). Second, the effects of SSI may be 
particularly consequential for SSI youth because they are at 
risk for poor life outcomes. SSI children grow up in house-
holds with incomes near or below the poverty line, generally 
with fewer than two parents. Mental conditions other than 
intellectual disability—including ADHD, speech delay, and 
autism spectrum disorder—have accounted for nearly all of 
the expansion in the SSI children’s program in the past two 
decades and now constitute the primary diagnosis for the 
majority of SSI children. SSI youth with mental conditions 
other than intellectual disability have school dropout rates of 
45 percent, school suspension rates of 52 percent, and arrest 
rates of 28 percent (Hemmeter, Kauff, and Wittenburg 2009). 
Their outcomes do not improve substantially in adulthood: 
former SSI children have employment rates of just 20–50 
percent as adults, depending on the cohort (Davies, Rupp, 
and, Wittenburg 2009).3 Third, SSI is a relevant context for 
studying the income stabilization effects of welfare and dis-
ability programs because the SSI population is a low-income, 
low-education population whose employment opportunities 
are restricted to jobs with high turnover and unpredictable 
hours. The bottom quintile of the earnings distribution in the 
United States has a within-person earnings variance (nor-
malized by the mean) more than double that of the middle 
quintile.4 Therefore, the primary alternative source of income 
for the SSI population is highly volatile earnings. 
The findings in this chapter inform long-standing issues 
in the debate over welfare programs. With respect to whether 
SSI inhibits labor market success and self-sufficiency, I 
find that most SSI youth would earn well below subsistence 
levels if removed from the program. I find no evidence for 
the hypothesis that SSI holds recipients back from self-suffi-
ciency or that removing even relatively healthy SSI recip-
ients would make them better off in the long run. Instead, 
removing SSI youth leads to a large reduction in lifetime 
income and a large increase in the volatility of that income. 
With respect to the level of insurance provided by SSI, I find 
that SSI affords a greater amount of insurance than suggested 
by previous analyses because it has substantial income sta-
bilization benefits. Ignoring the income stabilization benefits 
of disability programs, and possibly other social insurance 
programs, could substantially underestimate their value to 
recipients. 
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Chapter 2
The Effects and Channels of Early-Life 
Removal from Disability Insurance: Evidence 
from SSI Children 
The long-term effects of welfare programs on recipients, 
particularly children, have been fiercely debated but have 
proven difficult to measure. Cross-sectional estimates are 
confounded by the selection of individuals into welfare 
programs, and estimating long-term effects requires costly 
tracking of individuals over years or decades. The theoretical 
direction of the effect on children is ambiguous, reflecting 
the inherent trade-off in social insurance between consump-
tion smoothing and moral hazard. Welfare payments may 
give families income to make critical investments in child 
health and education, but the stigma or label of welfare may 
discourage achievement. 
Since its rapid expansion beginning in 1990, the SSI chil-
dren’s program has been at the center of the debate over how 
welfare programs affect children. The program makes cash 
payments to the families of over one million low-income 
children with qualifying disabilities, or about 10 percent 
of children living in poverty (Congressional Budget Office 
2013). In most states, it also provides categorical Medicaid 
eligibility to recipients. The common criticisms of welfare 
programs are amplified in the SSI context because pay-
ments are conditioned on the child’s disability. Critics argue 
that the SSI children’s program encourages households to 
present their children as disabled, possibly at the expense of 
the child’s health and educational achievement (see Kristof 
[2012], U.S. Congress [2011], and Wen [2010]). Supporters 
argue that SSI payments help families care for children with 
disabilities and may improve the outcomes of children (see, 
e.g., Ruffing and Pavetti [2012]). 
In this chapter, I address how removal from SSI during 
childhood affects earnings in adulthood and present evidence 
on the channels through which removal affects children. 
There has been little work on the long-term effects of dis-
ability programs on children and youth, even though their 
formative stage of development might make them most 
vulnerable to any perverse incentives or discouragement of 
achievement.5 Using a regression discontinuity design in 
birthdate, Deshpande (2015) finds that 18-year-olds who 
were removed unexpectedly from SSI as a result of the 1996 
welfare reform law experienced poor labor market out-
comes, earning on average just $4,000 per year in adulthood 
with minimal earnings growth over time. But the effect 
of removal on young children could be different from the 
effect of removal on 18-year-olds for several reasons, and 
the direction of the differential effect is ambiguous. On the 
one hand, removing children at a young age may encourage 
educational achievement and health improvements if the 
program induces moral hazard along these dimensions. On 
the other hand, by terminating cash payments and categorical 
Medicaid eligibility, early-life removal may inhibit a family’s 
ability to make critical investments in children during a 
formative period of life. 
To estimate the long-term effects of early-life SSI 
removal, I use quasi-random variation in child medical 
reviews, since they increase a child’s likelihood of being 
removed from the program. In response to budgetary 
pressures, the Social Security Administration reduced the 
number of child medical reviews between fiscal year (FY) 
2004 and FY2005. Nearly 100 percent of children who were 
eligible for a medical review at the end of FY2004 received 
one, while only 40 percent of children who were eligible 
for a medical review at the beginning of FY2005 received 
one. The discontinuity at the FY cutoff in the probability of 
review creates a discontinuity in the amount of time children 
spend on SSI before age 18, which allows me to identify the 
causal effect of removing children from SSI at a young age. 
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first research to esti-
mate the long-term causal impact of removal from disability 
insurance on young children. 
I find no difference between the adult earnings of chil-
dren who are removed from SSI at a young age relative to 
those who stay on SSI. However, the estimates are imprecise 
because only one-fifth of the sample has reached adulthood 
by 2013, the latest available year of earnings data. I plan to 
use future years of data, as more of the children reach adult-
hood, to improve the precision of the estimates. 
The reduced form effect of SSI removal on earnings in 
adulthood encompasses several distinct channels. First, if 
leisure is a normal good, then the loss of a stream of SSI 
benefits into adulthood is expected to increase earnings in 
adulthood through an income effect. Second, removal is 
expected to increase earnings in adulthood by reversing any 
moral hazard or stigma effects of the SSI children’s program 
that discourage human capital formation, such as educational 
achievement and health improvement. Third, by terminat-
ing cash payments and categorical Medicaid eligibility, 
SSI removal may have adverse human capital effects that 
decrease earnings in adulthood. The loss of SSI payments 
either reduces family income or, if parents replace the SSI 
income with income from work, may reduce parental care 
and attention. If cash payments allow for either monetary or 
time investments in children, or if categorical Medicaid eligi-
bility promotes child health, then the reversal of these human 
capital benefits is expected to reduce a child’s earnings in 
adulthood. 
Separate identification of these channels is key to under-
standing the channels by which welfare programs affect 
children. However, welfare programs in the developed 
world, which are rarely unconditional, offer few opportuni-
ties for disentangling the various channels. To shed light on 
this question, I present suggestive evidence from the younger 
siblings of the removed 18-year-olds in Deshpande (2015). 
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Younger siblings are likely to experience human capital 
effects associated with the family’s loss of SSI income. They 
are less likely to experience income effects because they 
are unlikely to receive their older sibling’s SSI income in 
adulthood, and also less likely to experience moral hazard 
effects because the older sibling’s disability benefits are not 
conditioned on the younger sibling’s health or behavior. I 
find that removing 18-year-olds from SSI causes a $3,100 
annual reduction in the earnings of their younger siblings in 
adulthood. The effects are particularly strong for younger sis-
ters. The 18-year-old’s removal does not affect the younger 
sibling’s own SSI receipt, meaning that the earnings loss is 
not the result of income or incentive effects from the younger 
sibling’s own SSI status. A more likely channel is the reduc-
tion in the family’s unearned income, which could either 
reduce total household income or reduce parental time at 
home. The large adverse effect of the 18-year-old’s removal 
on sibling outcomes suggests that the human capital effects 
of early-life removal could be substantial. 
The SSI context is a useful setting for studying the effects 
of welfare programs for several reasons. First, SSI is the larg-
est cash welfare program in the United States, with annual 
expenditures more than double those of the Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program (Congressio-
nal Budget Office 2013). Second, the effects of SSI may be 
particularly consequential for SSI youth because they are at 
risk for poor life outcomes. SSI children grow up in house-
holds with incomes near or below the poverty line, generally 
with fewer than two parents. Mental conditions other than 
intellectual disability—including ADHD, speech delay, and 
autism spectrum disorder—have accounted for nearly all of 
the expansion in the SSI children’s program in the past two 
decades and now constitute the primary diagnosis for the 
majority of SSI children. SSI youth with mental conditions 
other than intellectual disability have school dropout rates of 
45 percent, school suspension rates of 52 percent, and arrest 
rates of 28 percent (Hemmeter, Kauff, and Wittenburg 2009). 
Their outcomes do not improve substantially in adulthood: 
former SSI children have employment rates of just 20–50 
percent as adults, depending on the cohort (Davies, Rupp, 
and Wittenburg 2009).6 
The findings in this chapter offer evidence on both the 
extent to which and the channels through which early-life 
removal affects children’s outcomes. I find no evidence 
of a difference in adult earnings among children who are 
removed from SSI early in life versus those who stay on SSI, 
though future years of data will be critical for obtaining more 
precise estimates. However, I find large adverse effects of the 
removal of 18-year-olds on the long-term outcomes of their 
younger siblings. If these effects operate primarily through 
an adverse human capital channel, then it is possible that 
early-life removal has substantial and detrimental effects on 
children by reducing either family income or parental time 
and attention. Of course, this evidence does not speak to the 
magnitude of the income or incentive effects of removal, 
which are also important parameters. 
Chapter 3 
The Effect of Disability Payments on Household 
Earnings and Income: Evidence from the SSI 
Children’s Program 
In 2011, the SSI program paid $49 billion to 7.8 million 
low-income, disabled Americans, more than double the $18 
billion spent by the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families 
(TANF) program (Congressional Budget Office 2013). Some 
2.5 percent of Americans receive SSI benefits, and in some 
low-income communities household SSI receipt exceeds 15 
percent.7 The SSI program has tripled in enrollment since 
1980, while traditional welfare benefits have declined. 
Despite rapidly rising enrollment in this means-tested 
disability program, there is limited evidence on the implica-
tions of making welfare conditional on disability in addition 
to low income. As hypothesized by Akerlof (1978) and 
Nichols and Zeckhauser (1982), using disability as a “tag” 
may improve the targeting of welfare to the most deserving 
households and thus increase the cost effectiveness of public 
spending. On the other hand, a manipulable tag can create 
perverse incentives for households to qualify, which could 
have adverse consequences in the case of a tag like disability. 
The SSI children’s program has been singled out by policy- 
makers and the media for potential perverse incentives. 
Critics charge that the SSI children’s program encourages 
households to present their children as disabled, possibly at 
the expense of the child’s health and educational achieve-
ment (Kristof 2012; U.S. Congress 2011; Wen 2010). 
In this chapter, I estimate the effect of the SSI children’s 
program on parental earnings and household income, which 
are important outcomes for several reasons. First, there is 
little evidence on how families use SSI payments. The stated 
purpose of the SSI children’s program is to increase the 
resources available to children with disabilities, which could 
take the form of either greater financial resources or more 
parental time and attention. Understanding how families use 
SSI income can improve understanding of the preferences 
of low-income families and lead to better policy. Second, 
this analysis estimates an elasticity of earnings to unearned 
income for a highly policy-relevant population, which is 
informative for tax policy and for the design of welfare 
programs. Recent decades have seen a renewed focus across 
the political spectrum on increasing work activity among 
welfare participants and persons with disabilities. The earn-
ings response of parents of SSI children provides evidence 
on the labor supply effects of welfare programs that, unlike 
the Earned Income Tax Credit and TANF, do not include 
explicit work incentives. Moreover, the unique institutional 
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context of the SSI children’s program, explained in detail 
later, allows me to measure the earnings elasticity in a setting 
where income effects are likely to dominate substitution 
effects. These results could shed light on why households 
reduce their labor supply in response to welfare and disabil-
ity payments. Third, the effect of the SSI children’s program 
on household income is important for the interpretation of 
the program’s effects on the long-term outcomes of SSI 
children. If, for example, future work finds that the program 
improves a child’s health or educational outcomes, then the 
findings on parental earnings and household income shed 
light on whether the primary channel for these improvements 
is increased financial resources or greater parental attention. 
Evaluating the effects of the SSI children’s program poses 
identification and power challenges. Since SSI is a federal 
program with standardized payments, there is no meaning-
ful state-level or other cross-sectional variation in benefit 
amounts, and causal studies thus far have been restricted to 
survey data with limited sample sizes. Kubik (1999) uses the 
Current Population Survey and the National Health Inter-
view Survey to find that the 1990 liberalization of medical 
eligibility criteria for SSI children increased the number of 
children with a diagnosed disability. Duggan and Kearney 
(2007) estimate the effects of SSI child payments on house-
hold income using an event-study design from the Survey of 
Income and Program Participation. They find that enrolling a 
child in SSI increases household income by $400 per month 
without significant offsets from other transfer programs or 
earnings. 
To identify the effect of SSI on parental earnings and 
household income, I use a regression discontinuity (RD) 
design based on a change in the probability of removal from 
the program, paired with administrative data from the Social 
Security Administration. The RD takes advantage of a cut 
in the Social Security Administration’s budget for child-
hood medical reviews at the beginning of FY2005. Medical 
reviews are used to verify that children are still medically 
eligible for SSI, and they substantially increase the likelihood 
that a child will be removed from SSI. Nearly all children 
who were eligible for review at the end of FY2004 received 
a medical review, while the probability of review dropped to 
40 percent for those eligible at the beginning of FY2005. To 
complement the RD analysis, I use a difference-in-differences 
design based on similar variation in the timing of the child’s 
eligibility for medical reviews. 
I find that removing a child from SSI triggers a large 
response in parental earnings: a loss of $1,000 in the child’s 
SSI payment increases parental earnings—exclusively on 
the intensive margin—by $700 to $1,400, meaning that 
parents fully offset the loss in SSI payment. In addition to 
the increase in the level of parental earnings, I find some 
evidence that the volatility of parental earnings decreases in 
response to the child’s removal from SSI. In contrast to the 
substitution toward earned income, I find no substitution—
nor attempts to substitute—to alternative sources of disabil-
ity income. In fact, the loss of a child’s SSI payment leads to 
a large decrease in SSDI and SSI applications by the parents 
and siblings of the removed child. One explanation for this 
result is that households update their beliefs about disabil-
ity insurance as a reliable income stream in response to the 
termination of benefits and are discouraged from applying. 
I also find evidence of the importance of household-level 
shocks in the decision to apply for disability. 
There are several possible explanations for the magnitude 
of the earnings response, which is much larger than the few 
existing estimates of the elasticity of earnings to unearned 
income. First, SSI income has a high annuity value since it is 
a guaranteed income stream until the child turns 18 provided 
that the family can demonstrate a lack of medical improve-
ment. Especially for households with low education levels 
and marginal labor force attachment, the high volatility of 
earnings—the main alternative source of income—means 
that SSI income may have a much greater value than its dol-
lar equivalent in earned income. Second, this large elasticity 
estimate could be specific to this low-income population 
with children with disabilities. Low-income populations are 
more likely to face liquidity constraints that prevent them 
from smoothing, and they may also have a higher cost of 
work effort because of the low quality of available jobs. 
Single mothers with disabled children have a high opportu-
nity cost of working if it means leaving a disabled child at 
home unsupervised. Third, this earnings elasticity estimate 
is an estimate of the effect of losing SSI benefits and thus 
could reflect changes in household preferences induced by 
the SSI program itself. For example, households receiv-
ing SSI payments for several years may adapt to having a 
reliable income stream and, once they lose the SSI benefit, 
may attempt to continue that stream by substituting to earned 
income. I consider each explanation in turn. 
Finally, I take advantage of the unique institutional con-
text of the SSI children’s program to estimate the earnings 
response in a setting where income effects are likely to 
dominate substitution effects. The SSI children’s program 
has generous parental income limits relative to other welfare 
programs and to the potential earnings of its target popula-
tion, with no benefit phase-out until a relatively high level 
of parental earnings. Considered in this context, the large 
parental earnings response suggests that much of the labor 
supply discouragement effect from the program comes from 
an income effect rather than an incentive effect. In other 
words, households may reduce their labor supply in response 
to the income transfer itself, as opposed to marginal tax rates 
on earned income. 
Aside from the distinction between income and substitu-
tion effects, the parental earnings response and income sub-
stitution patterns do not have clear normative implications. 
Work may be costly in the sense that it decreases the amount 
of time parents can spend caring for disabled children. Even 
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if households fully replace lost disability income with earned 
income, disability income may still have large benefits if 
it improves household and child well-being. To provide a 
clearer normative picture, future work should evaluate the 
effect of the SSI children’s program on health, consumption, 
and the long-term outcomes of children. 
Notes
1. Several studies have examined the effects of adult disability 
programs on labor supply and human capital, including Bound 
(1989); Chen and van der Klaauw (2008); French and Song 
(2014); Hemmeter and Stegman (2013); Maestas, Mullen, and 
Strand (2013); and von Wachter, Song, and Manchester (2011). 
Coe and Rutledge (2013) and Kubik (1999) study children with 
disabilities. 
2. For example, Edin and Lein (1997) write that poor single moth-
ers in their study “had to weigh the utility of work against the 
real possibility that a subsequent layoff or reduction in hours 
could lead to serious material hardship. The jobs these mothers 
could get were among the least reliable in the U.S. economy” 
(p. 67). 
3. Cognizant of these poor life outcomes, the Social Security 
Administration recently launched two programs intended to 
address the self-sufficiency of SSI children in adulthood: the 
Youth Transition Demonstration and the Promoting the Readi-
ness of Minors in Supplemental Security Income Program.
4. Author’s calculations from the Continuous Work History 
Sample.
5. See Note 1. 
6. Cognizant of these poor life outcomes, the Social Security 
Administration recently launched two programs intended to 
address the self-sufficiency of SSI children in adulthood: the 
Youth Transition Demonstration and the Promoting the Readi-
ness of Minors in Supplemental Security Income Program. 
7. For example, Edin and Nelson (2013) report SSI rates of 15 
percent in Camden, New Jersey, compared to 12 percent of 
families receiving TANF benefits.
References
Akerlof, George A. 1978. “The Economics of ‘Tagging’ as 
Applied to the Optimal Income Tax, Welfare Programs, 
and Manpower Planning.” American Economic Review 
68(1): 8–19. 
Bound, John. 1989. “The Health and Earnings of Rejected 
Disability Insurance Applicants.” American Economic 
Review 79(3): 482–503. 
Chen, Susan, and Wilbert van der Klaauw. 2008. “The Work 
Disincentive Effects of the Disability Insurance Program 
in the 1990s.” Journal of Econometrics 142(2): 757–784. 
Coe, Norma B., and Matthew S. Rutledge. 2013. “What Is 
the Long-Term Impact of Zebley on Adult and Child Out-
comes?” Center for Retirement Research Working Paper 
2013-3. Boston: Center for Retirement Research.
Congressional Budget Office. 2013. Growth in Means-Tested 
Programs and Tax Credits for Low-Income Households. 
Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office.
Davies, Paul S., Kalman Rupp, and David Wittenburg. 2009. 
“A Life-Cycle Perspective on the Transition to Adulthood 
among Children Receiving Supplemental Security Income 
Payments.” Journal of Vocational Rehabilitation 30(3): 
133–151. 
Deshpande, Manasi. 2015. “Does Welfare Inhibit Success? 
The Long-Term Effects of Removing Low- Income Youth 
from Disability Insurance.” Working paper. Cambridge, 
MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
Duggan, Mark, and Melissa Schettini Kearney. 2007. “The 
Impact of SSI Enrollment on Household Outcomes.” 
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 26(4): 
861–885. 
Edin, Kathryn, and Laura Lein. 1997. Making Ends Meet: 
How Single Mothers Survive Low-Wage Work. New York: 
Russell Sage Foundation. 
Edin, Kathryn, and Timothy J. Nelson. 2013. Doing the Best 
I Can: Fatherhood in the Inner City. Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press.
French, Eric, and Jae Song. 2014. “The Effect of Disability 
Insurance Receipt on Labor Supply.” American Economic 
Journal: Economic Policy 6(2): 291–337. 
Hemmeter, Jeffrey, Jacqueline Kauff, and David Wittenburg. 
2009. “Changing Circumstances: Experiences of Child 
SSI Recipients before and after Their Age-18 Redetermi-
nation for Adult Benefits.” Journal of Vocational Rehabil-
itation 30: 201–221. 
Hemmeter, Jeffrey, and Michelle Stegman. 2013. “Subse-
quent Program Participation of Former Social Security 
Disability Insurance Beneficiaries and Supplemental 
Security Income Recipients Whose Eligibility Ceased 
Because of Medical Improvement.” Social Security 
Bulletin 73(2). http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v73n2/
v73n2p1.html (accessed October 8, 2015).
Kristof, Nicholas D. 2012. “Profiting from a Child’s Illiter-
acy.” New York Times, December 7, SR:1 
Kubik, Jeffrey D. 1999. “Incentives for the Identification and 
Treatment of Children with Disabilities: The Supplemen-
tal Security Income Program.” Journal of Public Econom-
ics 73(2): 187–215. 
Maestas, Nicole, Kathleen Mullen, and Alexander Strand. 
2013. “Does Disability Insurance Re- ceipt Discourage 
Work? Using Examiner Assignment to Estimate Causal 
Effects of SSDI Receipt.” American Economic Review 
103(5): 1797–1829. 
Murray, Charles. 1984. Losing Ground: American Social 
Policy, 1950–1980. New York: Basic Books. 
Nichols, Albert L., and Richard J. Zeckhauser. 1982. “Tar-
geting Transfers through Restrictions on Recipients.” 
American Economic Review 72(2), 372–377.
Ruffing, Kathy, and Ladonna Pavetti. 2012. “SSI Children 
2015 Dissertation Summaries 7
with Disabilities: Just the Facts.” Washington, DC: Center 
on Budget and Policy Priorities. 
U.S. Congress. 2011. Subcommittee on Human Resources of 
the Committee on Ways and Means. Hearing on Supple-
mental Security Income Benefits for Children.
Vallas, Rebecca D., and Elaine Alfano. 2012. “Children’s SSI 
Disability Benefits at Risk . . . Again.” Journal of Poverty 
Law and Policy 46(1-2): 61–69. 
von Wachter, Till, Jae Song, and Joyce Manchester. 2011. 
“Trends in Employment and Earnings of Allowed and 
Rejected Applicants to the Social Security Disability Pro-
gram.” American Economic Review 101(7): 3308–3329. 
Wen, Patricia. 2010. “The Other Welfare.” Boston Globe, 
December 12–14. http://www.boston.com/news/health/
specials/New_Welfare/ (accessed October 8, 2015). 
